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As the Royal Air Force celebrates its centenary, it is timely to survey how British popular 
images of military air power have changed over the past century, as reflected in books, films 
and the media.  I will argue that, although air professionals and a significant body of 
(overwhelmingly male) air enthusiasts have been fascinated by aerial technology and 
tactics, the British public as a whole has focused much more on the human traumas 
associated with the exercise of air power.  I will further argue that, although this 
preoccupation with human trauma has been enduring and deep-rooted, the particular form 
it has taken has varied very significantly over the past century.  It is important to recognise 
this variation over time, since there are growing signs that the pattern of public attitudes to 
air power which has become familiar over the past few decades may now be shifting yet 
again, with great potential significance for the political environment within which the RAF 
will have to operate in its second century of existence.1 
 
Hardware vs Humanity 
It would be easy to exaggerate the importance of aircraft themselves in British popular 
images of air power.  Ever since the first RAF ‘Pageant’ at Hendon in 1922, hundreds of 
thousands of people have flocked to watch displays and fly pasts by historic and 
contemporary military aircraft, whether at annual air shows like Farnborough or in free 
summer shows at seaside resorts around the country.2  Despite ever-growing resource 
pressures, the RAF still maintains its iconic ‘Red Arrows’ jet display team and its Battle of 
Britain Memorial Flight precisely to service these frequent air shows.  The fascination which 
high performance combat aircraft hold for many British males of all ages is demonstrated by 
the tens of thousands of books, journals and specialist videos and DVDs showcasing these 
streamlined war machines and detailing their technical specifications and operational and 
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design histories.  There is a continuing market for ready-made or self-assembly 3D scale 
models of the craft concerned, and aviation art has long been a profitable sub-genre of 
painting for British exponents like Frank Wootton and Robert Taylor.3  Writers like Alfred 
Price publish numerous popular analyses of air tactics and air campaign history, and many 
thousands of British men and boys recreate these tactics virtually via simulation games.4 
 
However, it would be wrong to over-estimate the influence of these air enthusiasts on 
British popular culture as a whole.  The average Briton could not even recognise a Hurricane 
or Tornado, let alone differentiate specific marks of these craft.  Although mass market films 
such as the 1964 classic 633 Squadron do sometimes include multiple shots of iconic aircraft 
(in this case Mosquitoes) swooping through the air, there are far more scenes focusing on 
the humans involved in the conflicts concerned.  With the exception of the Spitfire, whose 
distinctive curved form and Merlin engine roar have become emblematic of Britain’s ‘finest 
hour’, the popular culture of air power in the UK does not revolve primarily around the 
aircraft themselves, let alone their weapons or tactics.5  It focuses instead on the traumas 
which air conflicts create for the people involved, as I shall demonstrate in the remainder of 
this article. 
 
 
Risk and Fear 
Two factors dominated early British popular reactions to the novel phenomenon of military 
air power.  One was admiration for the daring displayed by early aviators in the face of 
severe personal risk.  As in other nations, the minority of air ‘aces’ such as Albert Ball and 
James McCudden who managed (at least for a while) to avoid being killed while downing an 
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increasing tally of hapless opponents were lionised as ‘knights of the air’.6  Misplaced 
popular ideals of chivalry in aerial duels were exemplified by W.E. Johns’ fictional air ace 
‘Biggles’, who appeared in nearly a hundred books from 1932 onwards.7   Real Second 
World War aces like Robert Stanford Tuck, Douglas Bader and Johnnie Johnson maintained 
the tradition, as did the continuing stream of published memoirs such as Cecil Lewis’s 1936 
book Sagittarius Rising and Paul Richey’s 1941 work Fighter Pilot.8 
 
Films of the time capture well the prevailing popular awareness of, and admiration for, the 
grave risks which these early aviators ran.   The 1938 film Dawn Patrol portrays First World 
War airmen grappling with the strain of successive perilous sorties, and even extending a 
chivalrous welcome to a captured German pilot who shot down their own veteran 
colleague.  The 1952 film Angels One Five shows an RAF squadron in the Battle of Britain 
bravely resisting the Luftwaffe despite continuing losses which soon claim the novice hero 
himself.  In both films, the air action takes place mostly off screen and the focus is instead 
on the strains which the aircrew endure between sorties.  Even when the dubious ideal of 
chivalry slipped and was replaced by a darker and more anti-heroic image of past aerial 
conflicts, as in the 1976 film Aces High and in Derek Robinson’s novels Goshawk Squadron 
(1971) and Piece of Cake (1983, televised in 1988), the focus remained squarely on how 
these young aviators coped psychologically with the enormous cumulative risks which 
combat flying during the World Wars entailed.9 
 
The second factor dominating early British popular images of military air power was fear of 
aerial bombardment of civilians.  Britain was especially sensitive to this potential threat 
because it had hitherto been shielded from the devastation of war by the Channel and the 
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dominance of the Royal Navy.  It is no surprise that it was British author H.G. Wells who 
highlighted the danger in his 1908 novel War in the Air.10  Even though the primitive raids on 
England by Zeppelins and later by multi-engine bombers in World War One inflicted three 
hundred times fewer casualties than British forces suffered in the carnage of the Western 
Front, they loomed very large in public concerns and were instrumental in the 
establishment of the RAF itself in 1918.11  In the inter-war years, apocalyptic fears of societal 
collapse through poison gas bombardment were dramatised in Wells’s 1933 novel The 
Shape of Things to Come (filmed in 1936), and they contributed significantly to Britain’s 
initial policy of appeasement of Nazi Germany.12 
 
When war came again for real, the combination of thwarted righteousness and the delayed 
and gradual escalation of German air attack allowed most British civilians to come to terms 
with the bombing in 1940-41 and to pride themselves on their ‘Blitz spirit’, holding firm 
against the unmitigated evil of their opponents.13    The V-weapons offensive of 1944-45 
was difficult to endure now that Britain was clearly on the brink of victory and last minute 
sacrifice became especially poignant, an atmosphere captured in Graham Greene’s 1951 
novel The End of the Affair (filmed in 1955 and again in 1999).14  However, civilian casualties 
in the UK were still a hundred times lower than those across the rest of the European 
continent, especially in the east.  What made civilian fear of aerial bombing an enduring 
feature of post-war British popular culture was not so much the UK’s actual experience in 
World War Two but rather the apocalyptic potential of the new atomic and hydrogen 
weapons.  Mushroom cloud imagery from the continuing atmospheric tests dominated 
media portrayals during the early Cold War, and television films like The War Game (1965) 
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and Threads (1984) documented in chilling detail how nuclear attack could affect British 
provincial cities.15 
 
If there is any single film which encapsulates British popular perceptions of air power in the 
mid twentieth century, it is surely Harry Saltzman’s 1969 production Battle of Britain, which 
has been shown repeatedly ever since on UK television.  This film does give a basic portrayal 
of the strategy and tactics of the battle, but it comes alive in its depiction of human trauma, 
be it the ambush of hapless novice pilots, the terrible consequences of burns injuries, the 
strain of repeated deadly sorties or the sudden randomness of bombing casualties, whether 
on RAF airfields or in Blitzed London, with age or gender being no protection.  Britain’s lone 
stand in 1940, as celebrated in Churchill’s famous rhetoric, has become a central pillar of 
national identity, and at its heart is a mainly positive image of air power as a shield wielded 
by ‘The Few’ brave men and women of the RAF to protect Britain’s civilian population 
against dastardly opponents.16  However, as the twentieth century progressed, a darker 
popular image of air power arose to challenge this positive association, as I will now discuss. 
 
Guilt and Perfectionism 
Air power is a double-edged sword, and defensive air campaigns like that of 1940 were 
always complemented by offensive air operations.  The infant RAF sought to survive the 
pressures of the inter-war years in part by championing ‘air policing’ of colonial territories as 
a more cost-effective alternative to traditional punitive columns of ground troops.  
However, Britons have always had a marked sympathy for the ‘underdog’, and so reliance 
on bombers as an asymmetric means of targeting tribal villages lacking in effective air 
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defence triggered growing concerns at home about the ‘unfairness’ of the practice and its 
impact on innocent civilians.17 
 
In World War Two, the progressively deadlier British air raids on German cities failed at first 
to provoke similar public disquiet.  The Nazis were seen as a much more existential threat, 
and they were perceived to have taken the lead in bombing civilians (as captured in 
‘Bomber’ Harris’s famous Biblical aphorism in 1942 that, ‘They sowed the wind, and now 
they are going to reap the whirlwind’).18  Furthermore, British airmen were clearly paying a 
very heavy blood price of their own in this campaign, as reflected in the fact that Bomber 
Command aircrew had the highest fatality rate of any service during the war except for the 
German U-Boat arm.19  The classic 1955 British film The Dam Busters focused entirely on the 
ingenuity, daring and heavy sacrifice of the Allied protagonists during their 1943 precision 
raid, while completely downplaying the fact that the breaching of the dams drowned 
around thirty people (mostly Soviet forced labourers) for every airman lost.20 
 
As British memories of the dangers and costs of World War Two became less vivid, there 
was an increase in retrospective guilt about the human impact of the area bombing 
campaign.  Books appeared describing the devastating firestorms at Hamburg in 1943 and 
Dresden in 1945, with the latter especially being seen by many as disproportionate given 
the proximity of Nazi defeat.21  Disquiet also grew about the morality and safety of relying 
on nuclear deterrent threats of even more indiscriminate and apocalyptic destruction.  Anti-
nuclear protest movements such as the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament arose especially 
in the 1950s and 1980s, and the classic 1964 film Dr Strangelove satirised the human 
weaknesses which could compromise the safe operation of nuclear deterrence.22 
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Britain’s use of air power in real post-war conflicts such as Korea, Malaya and Aden hardly 
registered in popular culture compared to the dread of nuclear Armageddon.  Britain was 
not directly involved in the ongoing conflict in Vietnam, but perhaps because of this 
detachment, it was just as susceptible to the development of a much more jaundiced image 
of air power.  Central to this changed perception was the increasing availability of anecdotal 
imagery in the shape of photos and film.  Hitherto, bombing targets had been seen only in 
grainy overhead imagery from the aircraft themselves, but now reporters on the ground 
could capture and relay vivid shots of the impact on individuals such as the naked and burnt 
nine year old Phan Thi Kim Phúc running towards the camera after a napalm attack in 
1972.23  Such anecdotal glimpses of ‘collateral damage’ were far more heart-rending than 
cold statistics, and they became even more potent with the later advent of real time 
satellite news coverage and of 24 hour TV news channels such as CNN.24 
 
Britain was lucky that its own air operations in the Falklands in 1982 and the Persian Gulf in 
1991 took place in remote and sparsely populated environments.  However, it soon became 
apparent that a further consequence of media anecdotalism was enhanced sensitivity to 
friendly aircrew losses, especially when downed crews were taken prisoner and paraded on 
television as happened to John Nichol and John Peters in 1991.25  Fortunately, technology 
and the increasing asymmetry of air conflicts seemed to offer a solution to this growing 
anecdotal sensitivity to friendly losses and collateral damage.  Electronic jamming, stand-off 
weapons and unmanned platforms enormously reduced the risk to friendly aircrew, while 
precision weapon guidance allowed ‘surgical’ strikes on point targets without the area 
devastation characteristic of the World Wars.26  The spectres of Dresden and nuclear 
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annihilation were displaced in the post-Cold War era by an almost god-like image of air 
power’s ability to disarm opponents quickly and cleanly with minimal risk to friendly forces 
or to civilians at home or in the battle area itself.27 
 
Sadly, such euphoria rarely lasts, and the new paradigm had two unfortunate consequences.  
The first was diminished popular respect for air personnel.  Whereas aircrew during the 
World Wars were admired for their evident daring in facing such appalling risks, modern fast 
jet crews tend to be portrayed as comfort-loving and risk averse compared to the ‘real 
heroes’ who face the enemy at close quarters.28  Journalist and historian Max Hastings 
wrote in 2007 that ‘the Army’s role is today overwhelmingly paramount’, and he described 
Air Force and Navy personnel as ‘not fighting forces in the same way’ and as ‘bureaucrats in 
uniform rather than warriors’.29  During the 1999 Kosovo campaign, there were claims that 
NATO aircrew prioritised their own safety over descending low enough for clear target 
identification, and in 2015 a British TV comedy pilot called Bugsplat! satirised the 
indifference and detachment of an RAF drone crew.30  There are even sporadic suggestions 
in the British media that the RAF should be re-absorbed into the other services to save 
precious resources.31 
 
The second unfortunate consequence of the new paradigm has been a revolution of rising 
expectations regarding the avoidance of collateral damage.  With air personnel themselves 
seen as enjoying almost god-like immunity from risk, it is natural that the traditional popular 
focus on the human traumas associated with air power has shifted even more towards the 
fate of those on the receiving end of air attack.32  For all its modern precision, air power is 
seen as vulnerable to poor intelligence and as less capable than ground forces of subtle and 
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discriminate interactions such as searching inside buildings, conversing with people, taking 
prisoners and building trust.33  Prime Minister Gordon Brown said in 2009 that, ‘what 
separates successful counter-insurgency from unsuccessful counter-insurgency is that it is 
won on the ground and not in the air’.34  Anecdotal media coverage invariably homes in on 
occasional mistakes such as the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade or of innocent 
wedding parties in Afghanistan or Iraq, and even though British aircraft have very rarely 
been involved directly in such episodes, popular images of air power are inevitably tarnished 
as a result.35 
 
If the 1969 film Battle of Britain best encapsulates British popular perceptions of air power 
in the mid twentieth century, then the equivalent encapsulation from the early twenty-first 
century is perhaps the very different British film from 2015, Eye in the Sky.  In this film, 
senior British military and political leaders agonise interminably over whether to launch a 
drone strike on a jihadi bomb factory on the other side of the world outside which an 
innocent girl is selling bread.  The screenplay focuses on the human traumas of ‘playing 
God’, the complex pattern of life in the target area, and the juxtaposition between 
incredible real time global surveillance and communication technologies and the relative 
inflexibility of the warhead which must either be withheld altogether or delivered with 
locally indiscriminate destructive effect.  In 2017, the British media focused for a while on 
the similar real life dilemma underlying the drone strike which reportedly killed British ISIS 
member Sally Jones at the expense of also killing her twelve year old son who was with her 
in the car.36  This individualised, forensic and unilateral image of air power is a world away 
from the previous paradigm in which thousands of combatants and non-combatants on 
both sides perish simply through the blundering horror of mass attritional air warfare.37 
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Compassion Fatigue                            
It is impossible to predict how perceptions of air power in British popular culture will 
continue to evolve in the decades to come.  However, there are several straws in the wind 
which suggest that the paradigm encapsulated in the film Eye in the Sky may not endure for 
long.  Foremost among these is the growing realisation that Britain and its Western partners 
do not in fact enjoy god-like military dominance and the luxury of precise and judicious 
application of force without reciprocal risk.  In Kosovo in 1999 and Libya in 2011, it looked 
for a while as if Western air power could intervene in ‘wars of choice’ to turn the tide 
against oppressive and bloodthirsty regimes and to rescue local populations without any 
loss of Western lives.38  However, the world of 2018 looks much darker and less tractable, 
with numerous tangled and seemingly interminable ‘wars among the people’, just as 
General Sir Rupert Smith predicted in 2005.39  Britain in 2018 feels less like a benevolent 
‘global policeman’ and much more like a beleaguered and reactive middle power, struggling 
to cope with increasingly complex and intractable economic and security challenges. 
 
One reason for this shift is frustration at having so gravely under-estimated the difficulty of 
achieving lasting stability through Western military interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan and 
Libya over the past two decades.40  A second factor is the revival of great power tensions 
with an increasingly assertive Russia and China, at the very time when Western unity is 
being compromised by Britain’s own tortuous and divisive Brexit process and by the rise of 
nationalist regimes in the USA, Poland, Hungary, Turkey and elsewhere.41  A third factor is 
the renewed sense of societal vulnerability to a wide range of threats, ranging from 
homegrown gang violence or jihadi terrorism to cyber attack, a mass influx of desperate 
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refugees or economic migrants, or even nuclear escalation by Russia or a newly capable 
‘rogue state’.42 
 
In this increasingly febrile atmosphere, in which the drowning of many thousands of 
refugees trying to cross the Mediterranean has been met with appalling ambivalence, it is 
scarcely surprising that public outrage at the depredations caused by aerial bombing has 
been more muted than one might expect.43   Although non-Western states such as Syria, 
Russia and Saudi Arabia have recently displayed striking ruthlessness in deliberately 
targeting civilian populations in coercive air bombardments, British arms sales to Riyadh 
have continued without much public outcry, and even the repeated use of poison gas by 
Syria has provoked little consistent response.44  The UK’s own recent air operations against 
ISIS have been much more discriminate, with a goal of ‘no civilian casualties’, but the 
murderous behaviour of the jihadis has put them so far beyond the pale that even the 
devastation of Mosul and Raqqa in the process of liberation aroused hardly any popular 
disquiet at home.45 
 
Recent experience illustrates clearly the limits of media anecdotalism.  Although even a 
single heart-rending photo (such as the toddler drowned in 2015 when trying to cross to 
Greece) can echo round the world and provoke outrage, media reports of the death of 
thousands do not evoke a proportionately greater response.46  This applies especially if 
access by camera crews is problematic or if the increasingly brazen and routine proliferation 
of ‘fake news’ muddies the waters and makes it hard to determine the truth.47  It is 
frightening how quickly humanitarian sensibilities can erode in an age of mass migration, 
indiscriminate terrorism, economic insecurity and old-fashioned power politics. 
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So does this mean that the RAF’s second century of existence may see a return to something 
like the political culture of the mid-twentieth century, with the British public more 
concerned about the risks to UK civilians and service personnel than with safeguarding 
innocents abroad?  There is certainly a chance that fast jet crews will regain something of 
their old heroic image as increasingly capable air defences undermine the utility of drones 
and deprive human aircrew of their accustomed invulnerability.48  It is also likely that public 
sensitivity to collateral damage will decline somewhat from its recent peak, as the focus 
shifts from ‘wars of choice’ to ‘wars of national interest’.  However, it is very hard to imagine 
the RAF returning to anything like the kind of deliberate coercive city bombing practised in 
the past by Bomber Command and more recently by the Russian and Syrian Air Forces.49   
For free democracies like the UK, legitimacy is an indispensable element of the application 
of military force, so it will remain vital for British air power to gain the moral as well as the 
aerodynamic high ground.      
                       
                                                          
1 For a fuller analysis of this and many other aspects of air power, see now Olsen, J. (ed.), Routledge Handbook 
of Air Power (London: Routledge, 2018) 
2 Blake, J. & Hooks, M., 40 Years at Farnborough (Yeovil: G.T.Foulis, 1990) 
3 Brook, J., Sixty Years of Airfix Models (Marlborough: Crowood, 2015);  Wootton, F., The Aviation Art of Frank 
Wootton (London: David & Charles, 2005);  Taylor, R., Robert Taylor Air Combat Paintings (Charlottesville VA: 
Howell Press, 2001) 
4 Price, A., Sky Battles, Sky Warriors (London: Brockhampton, 1998);  Thompson, S. & Smith, P., Air Combat 
Manoeuvres (Hinckley: Classic Publications, 2008) 
5 Rendall, I., Spitfire: Icon of a Nation (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2008) 
14 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
6 Kennett, L., The First Air War, 1914-1918 (New York: Free Press, 1990);  Spick, M., The Ace Factor, 
(Shrewsbury: Airlife, 1988) 
7 Johns, W.E., The Camels are Coming (London: John Hamilton, 1932) 
8 Johnson, J.E., The Story of Air Fighting (London: Hutchinson, 1985); Lewis, C., Sagittarius Rising (London: 
Peter Davies, 1936);  Richey, P., Fighter Pilot (London: Batsford, 1941) 
9 Robinson, D., Goshawk Squadron (London: Heinemann, 1971);  Robinson, D., Piece of Cake (London: 
Hamilton, 1983) 
10 Wells, H.G., The War in the Air (London: George Bell, 1908) 
11 Castle, I., The First Blitz (Oxford: Osprey, 2015);  Overy, R., The Birth of the RAF, 1918 (London: Allen Lane, 
2018) 
12 Wells, H.G., The Shape of Things to Come (London: Hutchinson, 1933);  Bialer, U., The Shadow of the Bomber 
(London: Royal Historical Society, 1980) 
13 Gardiner, J., The Blitz (London: Harper, 2010) 
14 Jones, E., Woolven, R., Durodie, B. & Wessely, S., ‘Public Panic and Morale: Second World War Civilian 
Responses Re-examined in the Light of the Current Anti-terrorist Campaign’, Journal of Risk Research, 9/1, 
Jan.2006, 57-73;  Campbell, C., Target London (London: Little Brown, 2012);  Greene, G., The End of the Affair 
(London: Heinemann, 1951) 
15 Sabin, P., The Third World War Scare in Britain (London: Macmillan, 1986) 
16 Mackenzie, S.P., The Battle of Britain on Screen (London: Bloomsbury, 2nd ed., 2016) 
17 Omissi, D., Air Power and Colonial Control (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1990) 
18 ‘On the Chin!’, Pathe Gazette, 1942, available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=to4djmDqJRI 
19 Hastings, M., Bomber Command (London: Michael Joseph, 1987) 
20 Sweetman, J., The Dambusters Raid (London: Arms & Armour, 1990) 
21 Middlebrook, M., The Battle of Hamburg (London: Cassell, 1981);  Irving, D., The Destruction of Dresden 
(New York: William Kimber, 1963);  Addison, P. & Crang, J. (eds.), Firestorm (London: Pimlico, 2006) 
22 Driver, C., The Disarmers (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1964);  Taylor, R. & Young, N. (eds.), Campaigns for 
Peace: British Peace Movements in the Twentieth Century (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1988) 
23 Hallin, D., The ‘Uncensored War’ (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986) 
15 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
24 Robinson, P., The CNN Effect (London: Routledge, 2005) 
25 Peters, J. & Nichol, J., Tornado Down (London: Michael Joseph, 1992) 
26 Olsen, J. (ed.), Airpower Applied: U.S., NATO and Israeli Combat Experience (Annapolis MA: Naval Institute 
Press, 2017) 
27 Ignatieff, M., Virtual War (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2000) 
28 Clarkson, J., Real Heroes: Courage under Fire (London: HarperBooks, 2010);  Lee. P., ‘Remoteness, Risk and 
Aircrew Ethos’, RAF Air Power Review, 15/1 (Spring 2012) 1-19;  Haynes, D., ‘Pilots rain down deadly bombs... 
then pause for pickle sandwiches’, The Times, Sep.24th 2016 
29 Hastings, M., ‘Our Armed Forces must now confront their greatest enemy: the MOD’, The Guardian, Apr.30th 
2007 
30 Norton-Taylor, R., ‘Call it a victory’, The Guardian, Jun.30th 1999;  Hookham, M., ‘”Killing jihadist fathers is 
hard”’, Sunday Times, Jun.18th 2017 
31 Lusher, A., Stones, A. & Wynne-Jones, J., ‘Disband the RAF, says Iraq war’s inspirational colonel’, The 
Telegraph, May 14th 2006;  Page, L., ‘Break up the RAF and stop buying British’, The Telegraph, Jun.1st 2015 
32 Blount, C., ‘War at a Distance – Some Thoughts for Air Power Practitioners’, RAF Air Power Review, 14/2 
(Summer 2011) 31-39 
33 Sabin, P., ‘The Current and Future Utility of Air and Space Power’, RAF Air Power Review, 13/3 
(Autumn/Winter 2010) 155-173;  Gregory, R., Clean Bombs and Dirty Wars (Lincoln NE: Potomac Books, 2015)  
34 Brown, G., ‘Afghanistan – National Security and Regional Stability’, an address at the International Institute 
for Strategic Studies, London, Sep.4th 2009 
35 Engelhardt, T., ‘The US has bombed at least eight wedding parties since 2001’, thenation.com, Dec.20th 2013 
36 Hamilton, F. & Fisher, L., ‘Jihadist’s son “collateral damage”’, The Times, Oct.13th 2017 
37 Kerbaj, R. & Shipman, T., ‘Spies told to come clean on Cameron’s order to kill’, Sunday Times, Feb.19th 2017 
38 Lambeth, B., NATO’s Air War for Kosovo (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001);  Mueller, K. (ed.), Precision and 
Purpose: Airpower in the Libyan Civil War (Santa Monica: RAND, 2015) 
39 Smith, R., The Utility of Force (London: Allen Lane, 2005) 
40 Haynes, D. & Evans, M., ‘Petraeus: allies will be in Afghanistan for decades’, The Times, Aug.28th 2017 
41 Haynes, D., ‘Take the fight against Putin into space, urges RAF chief’, The Times, Mar.28th 2018 
16 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
42 Gilligan, A., ‘London’s murder month outstrips New York’s’, Sunday Times, Apr.1st 2018;  Haynes, D. & 
Bridge, M., ‘Cyberforce of 1,000 to combat hostile nations and terrorists’, The Times, Mar.14th 2018;  Parfitt, T., 
‘My rockets are bigger and faster, boasts Putin’, The Times, Mar.2nd 2018 
43 Sheridan, M., ‘Italy targets charity rescue ships’, Sunday Times, Jul.2nd 2017 
44 Spencer, R., ‘Assad attacks rebel enclave with “chlorine and napalm”’, The Times, Mar.9th 2018;  Lucinda 
Smith, H., ‘Children among 68 killed in Saudi strikes on Yemen’, The Times, Dec.29th 2017;  Spencer, R. & Fisher, 
L., ‘Saudi prince signs £5bn deal for BAE fighter jets’, The Times, Mar.10th 2018 
45 Hookham, M., ‘UK general lays bare brutal cost of defeating Isis’, Sunday Times, Sep.24th 2017;  Elliott, F., 
Haynes, D. & Philp, C., ‘”Childish” minister rebuked after plea for jihadist deaths’, The Times, Dec.8th, 2017;  
Trew, B., ‘Battle for Mosul “claimed lives of 11,000 civilians”’, The Times, Dec.21st 2017;  Philp, C. & Simon, B., 
‘President makes good on his promise to pound Islamic State’, The Times, Jan.20th, 2018 
46 Smith, H., ‘Shocking images of drowned Syrian boy show tragic plight of refugees’, The Guardian, Sep.3rd 
2015 
47 Haynes, D., ‘Putin’s bots are “new Lord Haw-Haws”’, The Times, Mar.27th 2018 
48 Trew, B. & Parfitt, M., ‘Americans supplied missile that brought down jet, claim Russians’, The Times, Feb.5th 
2018;  Callaghan, L., ‘Israel attacks Iranian targets in Syria after fighter jet shot down’, Sunday Times, Feb.11th 
2018 
49 Spencer, R., ‘Doctors and children among hundreds dead in Assad blitz’, The Times, Feb.21st 2018 
